The (Lack of) International Response

On 12 February, members of the European Parliament (EP) finally addressed the “political crisis in Serbia” at a plenary debate in Strasbourg. They conveyed the message that all Serbian citizens must have the right to freedom of assembly and called for an investigation into the violent incidents involving student protestors. Marta Kos, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, called out Serbian authorities’ treatment of “a group of peaceful civil society activists from EU member states and candidate countries who were detained and later asked to leave.” 

This statement is in response to the SNS and its allies, most significantly Russia, conspiracy narratives that the protests are organized by the West and specifically Croatia, calling it a “coup” and another “colour revolution.” In an interview on Pink TV, a notoriously pro-government news outlet, SNS politician Ana Brnabić cited the use of a Croatian blockade manual published in 2009, “The Occupation Cookbook,” to organize the blockade and protests. She stated it is “clear that Croatia’s strategic interest is to ensure that Aleksandar Vučić does not remain Serbia’s leader.” However, this blockade manual is the only one of its kind published in the Serbo-Croatian language and linguistically accessible to all Serbian students. 

Similarly, the “Vecernje Novosti” newspaper published the Croatian passports of two student protestors claiming these students were sent by the Croatian government. Besides drawing criticism from several lawyers stating the publication of personal documents is illegal, both students were ethnic Serbs from the city of Knin in Croatia, part of the Serb Republic of Krajina during the war of the 1990s, and holding both Croatian and Serbian citizenship. Despite attempts to invoke historic Croatian-Serbian animosities from World War II and the 1990s war, the so-called foreign agent narrative has only increased momentum and distrust of Vučić and the SNS. 

The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have mostly stayed silent on the ongoing protests. The decisive and immediate shift in US foreign policy priorities away from decades-long liberal internationalism under the new Trump administration explains the silence on the part of the former. But why has the EU seemingly looked the other way despite the months of anti-corruption protests? This may stem from the larger trend of EU resources being directed towards people and civil society organizations willing to work with current governments rather than against them. In the case of Serbia, there is no strong opposition to Vučić and the SNS party. As one student protester said, “the opposition [in Serbia] is the worst we’ve ever had, it’s unelectable… [it’s] so split, they fight amongst themselves.” This is partly due to the state media capture and misuse of state resources by the ruling party. For example, in the last presidential elections, Vučić received 74% of the media time designated for all presidential candidates.

The lack of a proper replacement for President Vučić is the most likely explanation, leaving European leaders to prefer working with the ruling party, which has a history of paying lip service to EU demands but not meaningfully implementing said reforms. A similar but more nefarious explanation is that as Vučić and the SNS party continue to lose domestic support, the EU could see this as an opportunity to push Vučić to accept more EU concessions in his weakened position. Erring on the more realistic side, it might be that Serbia simply isn’t high enough on the European priority list amidst more pressing geopolitical concerns such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and fear of the American security blanket being torn out from under them. On the other hand, the cold relations are caused by both sides, with Serbia’s leadership making it clear that EU membership is not something they see as happening and pursuing a foreign policy balancing between the EU, Russia, and China.

Other Foreign Actors: Chinese Investment & BRI

The piece of this story continues to remain absent from much public scrutiny of the role of China. Serbia and China’s Exim Bank signed international agreements awarding the modernization of two key railway sections to China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company. These documents were made publicly available, but the commercial contracts between Serbia and China remain inaccessible, including the documents on the section covering the Novi Sad railway station. Another factor shielding Chinese companies from blame was that a Serbian subcontractor, Starting, was hired by the Chinese consortium to renovate the Novi Sad rooftop, according to a letter from Chinese firms on 3 November 2021.

The murky role of Chinese firms and investment in the construction project adds a layer of complexity to the possible full transparency by the Serbian government. President Vučić and the SNS may not be able to meet the students’ demands for full publication of the reconstruction documents because of possible political consequences in Serbia-Chinese relations or if China simply refuses. In January 2024, while the train station was undergoing renovation, an investigative journalist from Novi Sad requested documents on contracts and invoices from the Ministry of Construction, Transport, and Infrastructure. The Ministry responded that the Chinese contracting company would not provide these documents until the completion of the project. While the students are unlikely to compromise on this first demand, the Serbian government is even more unlikely to have leverage over a global superpower. 

What’s Next for Serbia? 

While the president has fulfilled the fourth demand, increasing the state education budget, the student’s first demands have not been fully met, despite the publication of documents on three separate occasions. The government holds firm that “there is nothing to hide” and all the documents will be published promptly. The second and third demands regarding the arrest of thugs sent to provoke the students and the release of uncharged protestors have also not been fully satisfied. If either side doesn’t budge, the state will have a serious problem dealing with an incoming generation of students, specifically at the university level where many depend on dormitory housing. 

However, the largest challenge for student protestors is one Serbia and the Balkans have been battling since before Socialist Yugoslavia. Looming in the background of the current political crisis is Serbia’s long history of organized crime and corruption – notorious criminals and thugs mobilized during the 1990s wars, the economic collapse in the 2000s, and the assassination of democratically-elected Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić by members of the notorious Zemun clan in speculated collaboration with state law enforcement in 2003. Serbia, at a geographic crossroads between Western Europe and the Middle and Far East, provides fertile ground for international drug trafficking, the country’s most profitable form of organized crime according to the 2015 Regional Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA).

The entanglement of organized crime, political elites and institutions, and law enforcement is much deeper and wider than the Novi Sad tragedy and the current ruling party but demands for transparency, rule of law, and accountability are the strongest they have been in decades. Despite the ruling party’s continuous attempts at repression, violent provocation, and media propaganda, the student protestors have demonstrated incredible resilience, determination, and substantial progress unimaginable only a few months prior. If liberal and democratic values are the true guide to aspiring members‘ path to European Union membership, Serbia’s student protests should be shown its due attention and support by the West.

Julia Davies is a U.S. Fulbright Student Researcher studying Peace, Security, and Development Studies at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade.

Disclaimer: Views presented here are those of the author solely and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Strategic Analysis.