Strategic Analysis Caucasus Brief

Review of October 2024

Tomáš Baranec 

Armenia

Vineyards, Aragatsotn province, Armenia. Photo: Elena Diego/ Shutterstock.com

Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process

After several months of incremental progress that raised hopes a durable settlement was at hand, the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process appears to have entered another retrograde phase. According to eurasianet.org, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has seemingly paused negotiations. In an October 4 speech in Jabrayil, a city that Azerbaijan regained control of in 2020, Aliyev cautioned Armenia against trying to rearm to reverse Yerevan’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Let them not forget the history of the Second Karabakh War. Let them not forget how they begged us on their knees for mercy, how they appealed to Russia at the highest level 10 times a day, asking to stop the war,” said Aliyev, referring to the 44-day conflict in 2020, in which Azerbaijani forces recaptured from Armenia most of the territory it had lost during the First Karabakh War, which ended in 1994.

Aliyev’s speech occurred just days after a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in New York, mediated by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Following those discussions, both sides pledged to intensify efforts to conclude a peace treaty.  Meanwhile, Armenia continued to push for an agreement to be signed ahead of November’s COP29 summit in Baku. Sargis Khandanyan, an MP from Armenia’s ruling Civil Contract party, told Armenpress that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan offered to organise a meeting to conclude and sign a peace agreement ahead of the summit, which is scheduled to be held in Baku between 11 – 22 November.

As the OC Media reminded, since late August, Armenia has offered to sign an interim peace treaty based on articles it agreed on with Azerbaijan. Baku has refused Armenia’s offer despite similarly proposing to do so earlier this year. Later, Aliyev called the Armenian offer “completely unrealistic,” noting he was not aware of any existing precedents for such an agreement.

At the same time, the US tried to step in to accelerate the process of signing a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. During a meeting in Baku with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on October 21, Michael Carpenter, US Assistant to the President for European Affairs, delivered a letter to him from US President Joe Biden. Carpenter reaffirmed US support for the swift signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On October 17, former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian stated that Azerbaijan is unlikely to make any concessions to Armenia and will continue to impose unreasonable demands if Armenia fails to present its counter-demands.

He criticised the Armenian government for its failure to anticipate that Azerbaijan would seek to extract maximum benefits without offering Armenia even minimal concessions. While acknowledging that inexperience may explain some missteps, Oskanian argued that it is unacceptable to ignore the expertise and warnings provided by seasoned professionals. He drew a parallel to a statement made in 2018 regarding the decision to start negotiations from a “new point,” which, he contended, ultimately led to unfavourable outcomes for Armenia.

According to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Armenia, 56% of respondents support the signing of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Of these, 31% fully support it, while 25% support it to some extent. The survey was conducted from September 13 to 25.

Significant portion of Armenian citizens who support the normalisation of relations (40%) oppose any changes to the country’s constitution, as requested by Baku. Only 3% are ready to make concessions in the process of border delimitation, and just 1% consider the withdrawal of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and granting Azerbaijan a “corridor” through Armenian territory as acceptable concessions.

Sources:
  • AVETISYAN Ani, Eurasianet.org, “Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process hits a new speed bump”, https://eurasianet.org/armenian-azerbaijani-peace-process-hits-a-new-speed-bump
  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, https://oc-media.org/peace-talks-flounder-as-armenia-pushes-for-deal-with-azerbaijan-before-cop29/
  • JAM News, „Joe Biden’s letter to Ilham Aliyev: what does it mean?”, https://jam-news.net/bidens-message-to-aliyev/
  • Caucasus Watch, “Former Armenian Foreign Minister Criticizes Government’s Negotiation Strategies with Azerbaijan”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/former-armenian-foreign-minister-criticizes-governments-negotiation-strategies-with-azerbaijan.html
  • JAM News, “56% of Armenians back a peace deal with Azerbaijan: IRI survey”, https://jam-news.net/iri-survey-in-armenia-an-in-depth-analysis-of-key-issues/
Cautious progress on the border delimitation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan

On October 23, the Armenian Parliament ratified the regulation on joint activity of the Armenia-Azerbaijan commissions on delimitation and border security. Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev added his signature on October 26 following the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

The Armenian Parliament ratified the regulation during the plenary session with 67 votes in favour. Only the ruling Civil Contract faction participated in the vote. The two opposition factions, Hayastan and Pativ Unem, boycotted the debates and the vote. The regulation was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in late August 2024. Earlier, Armenia’s Deputy Prime Minister and chair of the Armenian State Commission on border delimitation, Mher Grigoryan, said that he is not worried about whether Azerbaijan will ratify the regulation. However, he noted that “the signing logic assumes that it should be synchronous” and that if one of the parties does not complete the ratification process, “the process will be interrupted.”

Meanwhile, on the same day, Grigoryan commented on the development of border delimitation, an Initiative Group on Return to Western Azerbaijan was established in the Azerbaijani Parliament to facilitate the rights of “forcibly deported Azerbaijanis to return to their native lands.”

Armenian opposition groups saw this move as a “response” to the Foreign Affairs Committee approving the regulations. “Today in the parliament, the infamous regulation reporter, the Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia, expressed confidence that the process of adoption of the regulation is underway in Azerbaijan, synchronously, but the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan has, not coincidentally, taken a symbolic step today”, Tigran Abrahamyan, an MP from the I Have Honour faction, wrote on Facebook as cited by OC Media.

Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev signed a decree approving the regulation of the joint activity of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s border delimitation commissions following his meeting with Pashinyan at the 16th BRICS summit. In his address at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Pashinyan said that Armenia and Azerbaijan “will be able to activate the process of demarcation” as soon as the regulation comes into force in both countries.

Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the delimitation process, saying that he is pleased that it has started and that “it is the right path towards peace”. He also praised the “exchange of views” during the summit, adding that it was “already positive for our event.”

On October 21, Grigoryan stated during the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Relations session that Armenia and Azerbaijan had not yet determined the next section to delimit their state border following the Tavush section. Grigoryan noted, “There have not even been discussions about the next section. The principles on which the plots will be selected have not yet been fixed. There is one precept — the issue must be resolved by consensus. One of the parties cannot just say, “we want to hold here, and that’s it.” Addressing concerns about Baku potentially interrupting the delimitation process after securing desired territories, Grigoryan acknowledged that such risk always exists.

Grigoryan confirmed that there is still no agreement on the next delimitation section, highlighting that the initial focus will be on internal state procedures. Following the adoption of regulations, notifications will be exchanged, and discussions regarding delimitation in other sections will commence. He also clarified the significance of the 1975 map, stating that it comprises maps from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, created between 1974 and 1978 and enforced in 1979. However, he noted that these maps are not the sole reference for the delimitation process. Grigoryan stated that it is impractical to fix a specific map in the regulations, as the appropriate map will depend on the area being delineated, and specific maps from different years must be referenced.

The agreement signed on August 30 involves “regulations” for joint activities of Armenian and Azerbaijani government commissions dealing with the delimitation process. It says that the process will be based, unless agreed otherwise, on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration in which newly independent ex-Soviet republics recognised each other’s Soviet-era borders.

The six other articles of the agreed regulations are short on specifics. They do not say which maps, if any, will be used by the sides. Opposition parliamentarians again pounced on this fact during the committee meeting. The deal also does not specify which sections of the border will be delimited first and when. Armenian opposition lawmakers say it will, therefore, not prevent Azerbaijan from demanding more Armenian territorial concessions. They say that Baku will agree to delimit only those border sections where it could make further territorial gains dangerous for Armenia’s national security, wrote Azatutyun.am.

Sources:
  •  Armen Press, “Armenian parliament ratifies Azerbaijan border delimitation regulation”, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1202976
  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Armenia to ratify joint commission regulation, no updates from Azerbaijan”, https://oc-media.org/armenia-to-ratify-joint-commission-regulation-no-updates-from-azerbaijan/
  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, Aliyev signs joint border demarcation regulation following BRICS meeting with Pashinyan, https://oc-media.org/aliyev-signs-joint-border-demarcation-regulation-following-brics-meeting-with-pashinyan/
  • Caucasus Watch, “Armenian Deputy PM Outlines Challenges in Border Delimitation with Azerbaijan”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/armenian-deputy-pm-outlines-challenges-in-border-delimitation-with-azerbaijan.html
  • GALSTIAN Shoghik, Azatutyn.am
The ruling party unable to find a new justice minister following Minasyan’s resignation

Armenian Justice Minister Grigor Minasyan submitted his resignation on October 1, after some two dozen ruling party Civil Contract MPS circulated a petition demanding that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan fire him over what they described as a lack of progress in reforms.

The MPs were angered when Minasyan appointed Sirvard Gevorgyan as his deputy. They claimed Gevoryan was sympathetic to former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan now heading the main opposition Hayastan alliance. Gevorgyan resigned in response to the petition to sack her boss.

Minasyan blamed his resignation on “extremely unfair and petty attacks by some individuals.” further infuriating certain members of the government. Addressing the accusation of slow progress under his tenure, Minasyan said ministers are “policy-makers” and that the implementation of steps to restore justice in the country falls on law enforcement and the courts. “In the parliamentary system of governance, it will be difficult to hold the position of a minister if you do not have positive cooperation with even one deputy. I was informed that I have a problem with about two dozen deputies of the Civil Agreement faction,” Minasyan wrote in his resignation statement, as cited by Hetq.am.

Since Minasyan’s resignation, the party’s governing board has considered eight candidacies for the vacant post. None of them has been backed by a majority of the board members. One of the board members, parliament speaker Alen Simonian, said that Pashinyan’s party should now consider designating other candidates who are not Civil Contract members. Such individuals have already been proposed, he said without naming anyone.

Sources:

  • Hetq.am, “Armenian Justice Minister Resigns Citing Political Infighting”, https://hetq.am/en/article/169804

  • Galstian Shoghik, Azatutyun.am, “Ruling Party Still Can’t Agree On New Justice Minister”, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33170467.html

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Armenia extends protection status for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians

On October 17, Armenia extended the protection status for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, without which they would not be able to leave the country, reported OC Media. Yerevan noted that the documentation process had been simplified, urging refugees planning to cross the border “to immediately” update their documents. They also warned of potential backlogs and noted that the number of applications may increase towards the end of the year.

While the certificate will no longer be required to enter Armenia, a valid certificate will be mandatory, along with a valid passport to leave the country. They also noted that amendments related to the validity of the certificate had been made so that the process of renewing the certificate next time would be carried out automatically.

This status was given to over 100,000 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who did not apply for Armenian citizenship following the mass displacement in 2023. As JAM News reminds, according to the press office of the Migration Service of Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, 3,431 refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh had received Armenian citizenship as of October 10. According to the Migration Service, 5,409 refugees have applied for Armenian citizenship.

“On average, between 50 and 80 applications for citizenship are submitted daily. By law, the process typically takes around 90 business days. However, for displaced persons from Karabakh, this period has been reduced to two months,” a press service representative reported on October 13.

Displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh currently residing in Armenia are under temporary protection, which grants them a status equivalent to refugees. Refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh are required to accept Armenian citizenship to secure employment and access state support programs. However, the majority have yet to complete the necessary paperwork. Only three per cent of refugees had obtained Armenian citizenship in early October. Many fear that by doing so, they may lose the right to return to their homeland and the property they left behind.

The Migration Service also reminds that various state assistance programs are available for Karabakh refugees. Among them is the “40+10” program, which provides each refugee with 40,000 drams for housing rent and an additional 10,000 drams for utilities. This program has been in place since last year and does not require the acceptance of Armenian citizenship.

There is also a state program that provides housing certificates. One such program offers certificates worth 10 million drams (approximately 26,000 USD), issued to families of displaced persons from certain regions of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. Another assistance program offers 3.4 million drams (approximately 8,831 USD) or 5 million drams (approximately 13,000 USD) to each refugee family member. However, to qualify for this aid, refugees must obtain Armenian citizenship.

More than 960 refugees have applied for financial assistance, and around 30 families have received certificates to purchase an apartment. In total, 3,946 families submitted applications for the 10 million dram housing certificate, and 3,025 families have already received them.

The Migration Service reports that the “40+10” program for individuals of working age will conclude in December of this year. From January 2025, only those under 18, people with disabilities, and retirees will be eligible for this assistance.

Sources:

  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Armenia extends protection status for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians”, https://oc-media.org/armenia-extends-protection-status-for-nagorno-karabakh-armenians/

  • JAM News, „Karabakh Armenians reject Armenian citizenship: fears and expectations”, https://jam-news.net/armenian-citizenship-fears-of-karabakh-armenians/

Armenian Border Guard Troops to join the protection of Armenia-Iran and Armenia-Turkey borders

Armenian National Security Service border troops will take over full control of the checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border from Russian troops from January 2025, with Armenian border guards also serving alongside the Russian contingent along the borders with Iran and Turkey.

The agreement was announced by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s spokesperson following a meeting between Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 8 on the sidelines of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Prime Minister Pashinyan expressed gratitude to President Putin for the service provided by the Border Guard troops of the Russian Federal Border Service at the border control point between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran since Armenia’s independence.

Press secretary for Armenian Prime Minister Nazeli Baghdasaryan stated on her Facebook page that during the meeting, Prime Minister Pashinyan presented the details of Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” project, handed its brochure to the Russian President, and expressed concern about the language and terminology used by certain Russian officials regarding regional issues. He emphasised that the narrative of the government of the Republic of Armenia concerning regional communications remains consistent in both closed and open formats.

Sources:
  •  BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Armenian border guards take over Iranian border checkpoint from Russia”, https://oc-media.org/armenian-border-guards-take-over-iranian-border-checkpoint-from-russia/
  • Armen Press, “From January 1, 2025, Armenian Border Guard Troops to join protection of Armenia-Iran and Armenia-Turkey borders”, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1201798

Azerbaijan

City of Shusha. Photo: Eva Mont/ Shutterstock.com

Azerbaijan steps up repression before the COP29 conference

Shortly before the COP29 climate conference, Baku further escalated repression against environmental and peace activists as well as defenders of the rights of ethnic minorities. Nazim Baydamirli, a government critic and former member of the Azerbaijani Parliament, has received an eight-year prison term following a conviction on extortion charges. He asserts his punishment is political, connected to comments made in support of an environmental protest in 2023.

The protest occurred in June 2023 in Soyudlu, a village in western Azerbaijan, and was sparked by opposition to plans to expand a reservoir to hold toxic waste created by gold mining operations. Ultimately, police used violent tactics to disperse the protesters, including pepper-spraying old women and making 11 arrests. Baydamirli, who was living in Baku then, expressed his support for the protesters and criticised the government’s heavy-handed response in an interview for the Voice of America.

Within weeks after his comments were broadcast, he was arrested and accused of trying to blackmail another individual with a sex tape, according to an Interior Ministry complaint. During his trial in late September, Baydamirli insisted he did not commit any crime and that his comments on the Soyudlu events did not violate any laws. “I have never made provocative speeches,” He said, according to the trial transcript.

On October 22, activist Ramazan Taghiyev was told by passport control at Baku’s airport that he could not leave the country due to a travel ban. According to Taghiyev, no state agencies had informed him of any restrictions beforehand, and the money he had spent on his flight ticket was not compensated. Taghiyev was leaving Azerbaijan to study abroad in Poland.

Taghiyev is the fifth person confirmed to have been banned from travelling since the arrest of researcher and OC Media contributor Bahruz Samadov on charges of treason. An activist who wished to remain anonymous told OC Media that almost 20 people in Azerbaijan were given travel bans in relation to the case against Samadov.

“Some of them now do not live in Azerbaijan, but I guess that they were also banned because all of them have connections or were friends with Bahruz”, they said.

The authorities usually do not inform people whether they have placed travel restrictions on them. At the same time, ethnic Talysh activist Mirhafiz Jafarzade, who advocated for the creation of Talysh school textbooks in Azerbaijan, has been sentenced to 16 years in prison on charges of treason.

That day, pro-government media reported that the trial had determined that Jafarzade worked “in secret cooperation with foreign special services to fulfil tasks assigned to the detriment of Azerbaijan’s state security and defence capabilities.” They also claimed Jafarzade “specified the location of military objects and sent their location and other information” through Telegram. One of Jafarzade’s close friends, who wished to remain anonymous, told OC Media that Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (SSS) had already taken an interest in Jafarzade back in 2021.

“Jafarzade was arrested at the Heydar Aliyev Airport in 2021 when he tried to fly from Azerbaijan to Russia”, he said. He added that Jafarzade’s belongings, including his laptop, mobile phone, and memory devices, were confiscated. His friend claimed he was arrested for refusing to cooperate with the security agency.

Jafarzade, who is also a Russian citizen, has actively defended the Talysh language and advocated for creating Talysh schoolbooks. Currently, no schools in Azerbaijan provide education in the Talysh language.

On October 1, Vidadi Isgandarli, an Azerbaijani opposition figure in exile well-known for his fierce criticism of the government, died in France after being brutally beaten and stabbed in an attack at his apartment that his family says was politically motivated. The deadly attack on Isgandarli follows a similar pattern of violence against Azerbaijani opposition figures in exile; in 2021, another politician in exile, Mohammad Mirzali, survived being stabbed. “My brother had no idea who the attackers were or what motivated the assault… They did not speak, and they wore masks, making it impossible to identify them,” Oktay Isgandarli told RFE/RL. “I have no doubt this is a politically motivated assassination. My brother survived a previous attack by approximately 15 assailants in 2022 here in France.”

Sources:
  • Eurasianet.org, “Azerbaijan: Ex-MP gets an eight-year sentence for voicing support for former constituents”, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-ex-mp-gets-an-eight-year-sentence-for-voicing-support-for-former-constituents
  • FARHADOVA Aytan, OC Media, “Azerbaijani activist given travel ban at Baku Airport”, https://oc-media.org/azerbaijani-activist-given-travel-ban-at-baku-airport/
  • FARHADOVA Aytan, OC Media, “Azerbaijan sentences Talysh activist to 16 years in prison for treason”, https://oc-media.org/azerbaijan-sentences-talysh-activist-to-16-years-in-prison-for-treason/
  • SHARIPZHAN Merhat, RFE/RL, “Azerbaijani Opposition Figure Dies After Brutal Attack In France”, https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-opposition-isgandarli-kiled-france/33141955.html
Azerbaijan: Development in the field of energy

The development of a new Azerbaijani natural gas field indicates a further increase in the export of this commodity to the EU. At the same time, Baku is increasing exports to Serbia, and there are proposals to start exporting to Slovakia as well. Azerbaijan and a BP-led consortium reached an agreement on developing a new natural gas field in the Caspian Sea. The new reserve, found earlier this year, lies below the massive Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil field and could significantly increase Baku’s volume of gas available for export to Europe.

According to BP, the reserve is estimated to hold 4 trillion cubic feet of gas “in place,” or around 113 billion cubic meters (bcm). “Gas in place” refers to the total volume held in the reservoir, not all of which will be recoverable. BP said in a statement that the consortium drilled an appraisal well in early 2023 and, in July, confirmed the presence of “deep-lying gas reservoirs.” ACG consortium members are now working with SOCAR to formulate a development plan for the new gas reserve; production from the existing appraisal is expected to start in 2025.

According to Eurasianet.org, the new agreement is good news for Baku, which has been hedging of late on its promise to double gas exports to European Union states to 20 bcm a year by 2027. Speaking in July, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev said that Baku was aiming to export 16 bcm a year to Europe by 2027. Last year, Azerbaijan’s exports to Europe through the three pipelines that make up the Southern Gas Corridor totalled 11.8 bcm, up from 10 bcm two years ago.

Uncertainty over Baku’s ability to deliver on its 20 bcm by 2027 export target created a chicken-or-egg-type scenario in which buyers are reluctant to commit to buying more gas from Azerbaijan, in turn making it difficult for operators of the three pipelines comprising the Southern Gas Corridor to attract the investment needed to expand pipeline capacity to handle 20 bcm per year.

Separately, BP and SOCAR signed an agreement to jointly prospect for hydrocarbons in two blocks in the Caspian Sea, dubbed Karabagh and ADUA. Earlier on September 26, SOCAR and Srbijagas, Serbia’s state-owned natural gas provider, signed a Purchase and Sale Agreement for an additional daily gas supply of 1 million cubic meters, covering the period from November 1, 2024, to April 1, 2025.

Meanwhile, on October 17, Ukraine proposed an alternative scheme for gas supplies to Europe, involving Azerbaijan as a gas exporter and Slovakia as a buyer. This proposal suggests a mechanism where the buyer, such as Slovakia, purchases gas either at the point where it enters Russia from Azerbaijan or at the Russia-Ukraine border. The owner of the gas would then manage its transportation through Russian territory, store it in Ukraine’s underground storage facilities, and retain the option to use it or sell it abroad. In this arrangement, Ukraine would act not as a transit country but as a re-exporter.

A critical aspect of the proposal is that each party must independently negotiate with Russia to ensure the security of the gas supply, thus protecting Ukraine’s gas transportation system amid ongoing hostilities. In May, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated, “Azerbaijan now exports gas to eight countries. I hope Slovakia will become the ninth.” However, according to RBC Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s interest in supplying gas to the European Union via Ukraine has diminished, with Baku not raising the issue in the past four months. This decreased engagement may be linked to Russia’s role in the process.

Sources:
  •  O’BYRNE David, Eurasianet.org, “Azerbaijan: New discovery raises odds that Baku can meet 2027 EU gas export target”, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-new-discovery-raises-odds-that-baku-can-meet-2027-eu-gas-export-target
  • Caucasus Watch, “SOCAR to Supply Serbia with Additional 1 Million Cubic Meters of Gas Daily”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/SOCAR-to-supply-serbia-with-additional-1-million-cubic-meters-of-gas-daily.html
  • Caucasus Watch, “Ukraine Proposes Alternative Gas Supply Scheme Involving Azerbaijan and Slovakia”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/ukraine-proposes-alternative-gas-supply-scheme-involving-azerbaijan-and-slovakia.html
Baku increasingly looking for partnerships in the East and North

On October 22, Rahman Mustafayev, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Moscow, emphasised that strengthening cooperation with BRICS aligns with Azerbaijan’s national interests. Mustafayev highlighted that this collaboration “organically fits” into Baku’s long-standing efforts to establish a fair global order and create equal opportunities for all nations. He noted, “On one hand, Azerbaijan advocates for increasing the authority of the UN, its role, and effectiveness as a universal organisation designed to play a central coordinating role in international relations. On the other hand, it shares the ideology of a multipolar world, forming a world order free from double standards and excluding the creation of dividing lines.”

Mustafayev also pointed out that BRICS is focused on the global South, a region where Azerbaijan traditionally holds a significant and often leading role. “Azerbaijan’s policy harmoniously fits into the ideology and practice of BRICS, supporting the principles of multipolarity and enhancing the role of developing countries in global politics and economics,” he added.

On October 22, Azerbaijani Energy Minister Parviz Shahbazov, who was in China to attend the 3rd Belt and Road Energy Ministerial Conference, met with several local companies. During his meeting in Beijing with Lin Xiadon, Vice President of China Energy International Group Co., Ltd., Shahbazov discussed accelerating the implementation of 160 MW power plants, the company’s potential involvement in offshore wind energy projects, the development of green energy corridors, and the local production of renewable energy installations. They also explored cooperation in establishing a joint research and development centre, agreeing to form a Working Group, and considering a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that reflects their new cooperation priorities.

In a separate meeting with Kai Song, President of Public Relations of Huawei in China, Shahbazov reviewed the prospects for collaboration in green energy with the company, which provides advanced technological solutions. They discussed the development of a renewable energy-based data centre with Huawei within the framework of Azerbaijan’s initiatives on green energy corridors and fibre-optic cable projects connecting Europe and Asia.

At the same time, Baku repeatedly criticised the West. On October 22, during discussions in the European Parliament, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement rejecting what it termed an “unacceptable, groundless, and completely biased” statement made by the European Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights, Nicholas Schmidt.

The Ministry condemned Schmidt’s statement that Azerbaijani citizens face criminal prosecution based on their political beliefs or that cases involving journalists or human rights defenders are politically motivated. The Ministry described these claims as “fundamentally incorrect”. It argued that “such a harmful approach” by the European Parliament and EEAS has proven ineffective and has only complicated relations between Azerbaijan and Europe.

The Ministry criticised the statement, reportedly prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS), as being disconnected from reality and an unsuccessful attempt to interfere in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs. Earlier, on October 5, 43 Azerbaijani MPs appealed to Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov to “review” the country’s relationship with the US, including withdrawing from several military agreements. In the statement, MPs demanded Bayramov to terminate the Joint Declaration on Future Military and Defense Cooperation, signed in 1997, and the Agreement on the Acquisition of Equipment and Mutual Services, signed in 2013.

They also demanded an immediate stop to any ongoing negotiations on new agreements or the extension of existing agreements and the suspension of all projects implemented by USAID and other US-based organisations. According to the OC Media, the appeal was made in response to a letter signed by 11 US Senators and 49 members of the House of Representatives on October 3, which urged Secretary of State Antony Blinken to take “immediate action” to address Azerbaijan’s human rights violations.

Sources:
  • Caucasus Watch, “Baku Eyes Closer Ties with BRICS for a Multipolar World”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/baku-eyes-closer-ties-with-brics-for-a-multipolar-world.html

  • Caucasus Watch, “Azerbaijan Strengthens Renewable Energy Ties with China at Belt and Road Summit”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/azerbaijan-strengthens-renewable-energy-ties-with-china-at-belt-and-road-summit.html

  • Caucasus Watch, “Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry Condemns ‘ EU’s Interference in Internal Affairs’”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/azerbaijani-foreign-ministry-condemns-eus-interference-in-internal-affairs.html

  • FARHADOVA Aytan, OC Media, “MPs demand Azerbaijan cut military ties with US”, https://oc-media.org/mps-demand-azerbaijan-cut-military-ties-with-us/

Georgia

 Photo: Shutterstock.com

Elections: Results

According to the Central Election Commission (CEC), 2.060.412 voters had cast their ballots in the parliamentary elections by 8 pm on October 26, representing 58.94 per cent of the total electorate.

According to CEC, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, won 53,93 per cent of votes, earning a majority of 89 seats in the Parliament. Coalition for Change followed it with 11,03 per cent (19 seats), Unity – National Movement with 10,17 per cent (16 seats) and Strong Georgia with 8,81 per cent (14 seats). The last party to pass the quorum was Gakharia – For Georgia with 7,78 per cent (12 seats).

Two other parties got more than 1 per cent of votes – Girchi (3 per cent) and Alliance of Patriots (2,44 per cent).

Sources:
  • https://civil.ge/archives/627971
Elections: Reactions of local and foreign observers

Georgian election observer coalition We Vote has claimed to have identified a scheme of “mass election fraud” by the Georgian authorities in the parliamentary elections on October 26. During a press conference in Tbilisi on October 28, the group said they would challenge and apparently demand the annulment of the results from 189 electoral precincts, representing over 300.000 votes. They said this number could yet go up. We Vote alleged an “organised fraud scheme” that the authorities prepared before the vote and used to rig the election.

Londa Toloraia, the group’s head, said they had collected over 370 pieces of photographic and video evidence, as well as eyewitness testimony, of the widespread use of multiple voting using copies of identification documents illegally collected before the vote. According to Toloraia, the Central Election Commission’s decision in August to assign roles to precinct election commission members seven days in advance rather than on election day itself was also instrumental in ensuring that people involved in the scheme were in the right positions to execute it. These registrars were then allegedly tasked with quickly entering the personal ID numbers written on those papers into the verification machine. They were then allegedly tasked with skipping or performing poorly the procedure of inking a person’s finger, which is meant to prevent people from voting multiple times. This allowed these fraudulent voters to cast ballots again in other polling stations.

According to Toloraia, these tactics were facilitated by intentionally arranging the polling area and placing registrars’ desks in a way that obstructed election observers from monitoring voter verification procedures. She reported that some of their observers who protested this arrangement were confronted by election officials and, in some cases, expelled from polling stations. Toloraia also accused pro-government observer groups of participating in the conspiracy by attempting to “neutralise” monitors by “stirring up chaos” to distract observers from monitoring voter verification.

International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) issued its Preliminary Findings and Conclusions on the October 26 Parliamentary elections, saying that elections “unfolded amid entrenched polarisation in an environment marred by concerns over recently adopted legislation, its impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society.” While “contestants could generally campaign freely”, reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign.” The report says that this, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, “raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution.”

The document also says that while the legal framework provides an adequate basis for democratic elections, “recent frequent amendments marked a step backwards, raising concerns over its potential use for political gain.” IEOM noted, “A significant imbalance in financial resources and advantage of incumbency contributed to an already uneven playing field.”

According to IEOM, the effectiveness of campaign finance oversight was undermined by limited enforcement and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalisation of the oversight body. Election day was generally procedurally well-organised “but marked by a tense environment, with frequent compromises in vote secrecy and several procedural inconsistencies, as well as reports of intimidation and pressure on voters that negatively impacted public trust in the process.”

The IEOM consists of observers from the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP), and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).

On November 1, Edison Research issued a statement on the Central Election Commission’s official results of the ruling Georgian Dream party’s 54 per cent victory in the October 26 elections, which differed dramatically from the credible polling figures. Edison Research’s exit polls gave the GD 40.9 per cent. “The 13-point difference between Edison’s estimate and the official result of 54% for Georgian Dream cannot be explained by normal variation alone and suggests local-level manipulation of the vote,” Rob Farbman, Edison’s Executive Vice President said, adding, “Edison’s review found that the deviation from statistically expected results was widespread but most pronounced at specific polling locations in rural areas. These locations are likely to have had the most significant vote manipulation at the polling location level.”

Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), which monitored the elections, further claimed that the new way of casting a ballot in electronic voting precincts made voters’ choices visible to other people. Based on these allegations, GYLA is seeking to have the election results in all electronic precincts – 90 per cent of the total 3.111 precincts – annulled.

The parliamentary elections of October 26, 2024, were the first elections in Georgia to be held largely using electronic voting. Electronic voting involves installing machines at polling stations to verify voters and count votes. It also provides a new way of voting: according to the traditional voting procedure, voters circled their preferred party in the voting booth, mainly with a pen, folded the ballot, put it in an envelope and then in a ballot box. In the new “electronic” procedure, on the other hand, the voter fills in a circle near the preferred party with a black marker, puts it in a special folder without folding it (preferably with the ballot upside down), goes to an electronic ballot box supervised by a commission member, and inserts it while the machine automatically ejects and absorbs the paper.

Sources:
  •  KINCHA Shota, OC Media, “Local observers outline scheme of ‘mass election fraud’ in Georgia’s parliamentary vote”, https://oc-media.org/local-observers-outline-scheme-of-mass-election-fraud-in-georgias-parliamentary-vote/
  • BENSON Brawley, Eurasianet.org, „International observers say Georgian elections marred by climate of pressure”, https://eurasianet.org/international-observers-say-georgian-elections-marred-by-climate-of-pressure
  • Civil.ge, “International Election Observation Mission Preliminary Findings and Conclusions”, https://civil.ge/archives/631442
  • Civil.ge, “Edison Research: 13-Percentage Point Difference Between Exit Polls and Official Election Results Suggests Vote Manipulation”, https://civil.ge/archives/633142
  • Civil.ge, “Concerns Mount Over Mass Breach of Ballot Secrecy During 2024 Vote”, https://civil.ge/archives/632640
Elections: Investigation into electoral fraud

On October 30, the Georgian Prosecutor General’s Office reported that it had opened an investigation into the alleged rigging of the parliamentary elections based on the address of the Central Electoral Committee (CEC) under Article 164 (Interference with the work of election or referendum commissions) of the Criminal Code. The Georgian Prosecutor’s Office announced that it is investigating 47 criminal cases linked to incidents before and on the day of the recent parliamentary elections.

These cases involve alleged election falsification, voter bribery, interference with voting rights, obstruction of journalism, election commission disruptions, pre-election violence, and property damage. The investigations were initiated based on appeals from opposition and ruling parties, the CEC, various organisations, and media reports.

The Prosecutor’s Office also noted that some individuals who claimed to have information about election fraud have not yet cooperated with the investigation, which has hindered progress. The office has called on these individuals to provide relevant information to ensure a thorough and efficient investigation,” the Prosecutor’s Office stated.

The CEC announced on October 29 its decision to ask the Prosecutor’s Office for an investigation into the “unfounded accusations” the CEC is facing after the announcement of the election results, saying that despite the OSCE/ODIHR also assessing the elections “positively”, and the work of the CEC “at the highest level, ” and an American auditing company “not finding any flaws” in the technology used, the Georgian President and some political parties are still “attacking and baselessly criticising” the work of the CEC in an attempt to “cause reputational damage” to the institution.

Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili held a briefing in which she presented part of the evidence of electoral fraud that took place during the parliamentary elections. “It turns out that the Prosecutor’s Office is waiting for evidence from me. I knew it was the other way around, that the investigative body had to find the evidence itself […] in any normal country it happens like that. I don’t know of any such precedent for the investigative agency to ask the President for evidence [regarding] the election”, she said. Zurabishvili addressed the Prosecutor’s Office directly, saying that they are accountable to the people and that “no one expects the Prosecutor’s Office to start some clearly political processes against the president in this situation today”. “These political [processes] strangely coincide with the instructions issued by [Dmitry] Medvedev — I don’t know who is fulfilling [them] and who is not”, she said.

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Photo: Shutterstock.com

Elections: Protest movement

In the context of suspicions about irregularities in the implementation of the parliamentary elections, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili and all representatives of the parliamentary opposition refused to recognise the results of the elections and called on their supporters to protest. After a day of intensive consultations with opposition parties following the October 26 parliamentary elections, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili held a briefing in which she said she would not recognise the official election results. She thanked all the voters who voted for Georgia’s European future: “There were lots of you. You won in these elections, and no one has a right to take this European future away from us.”

The President called on citizens to gather on Rustaveli Avenue on October 28 and “tell each other and the world that we don’t recognise these elections. We defend our constitutional rights and, every vote and our future. It is our right to have just, free, and fair elections. This will be a symbolic act to show the world our will.” She also called on international partners to stand by the Georgians.

In its reaction, representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream party accused the opposition and CSOs of spreading elections-related disinformation. Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili claimed that the opposition and CSOs spread disinformation against the election results and the violations. In particular, he referred to the slide circulated in the social networks, showing the drastic discrepancy between the October 26 official results of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the Edison Research exit polls, in stark contrast to the previous year’s elections. He claimed that the Edison Research exit polls, sponsored by the opposition-leaning Formula TV, had been manipulated to “undermine and discredit democratic elections.”

On October 26, Around 100.000 people gathered in Tbilisi evening in front of the parliament building to protest the results of the October 26 parliamentary elections. The opposition presented its plan and demands, showing a united pro-European front. They declared the elections illegitimate, refused to enter the Parliament, and some vowed to withdraw their parliamentary lists. They also showed determination to fight until victory. They demanded new elections under an international electoral administration.

The rally was the first time in a long time that the opposition parties led the rally and stood together to address the crowd. Only ex-Prime Minister and leader of the For Georgia party, Giorgi Gakharia, was absent from the scene with other leaders, although he attended the rally.

Sources:

  • Civil.ge, “Speaker Papuashvili Claims Opposition, CSOs Spread Election-Related Disinformation”, https://civil.ge/archives/631840

  • Civil.ge, “BREAKING: President Zurabishvili Rejects Election Results”, https://civil.ge/archives/631657

  • Civil.ge, “Photo Story | Thousands Denounce Elections Results at Peaceful Rally”, https://civil.ge/archives/632068

  • JAM News, “Over 100,000 people gathered in Tbilisi for a protest against election fraud. The West is in no hurry to recognise the results”, https://jam-news.net/over-100000-people-gathered-in-tbilisi-for-a-protest-against-election-fraud-the-west-is-in-no-hurry-to-recognize-the-results/

Georgian Manganese to stop work at Chiatura mines and ferroalloy plant

From November 1, Georgia’s two largest enterprises—the Chiatura manganese mines and the Zestaphoni ferroalloy plant—will cease operations for six months, according to business portal bm.ge, citing mine employees. Miner Tariel Mikatsadze told bm.ge that on October 30, a representative of the company Manganese met with workers, informing them without further explanation that operations would be halted until April 2025. During the shutdown, employees are to receive 60 per cent of their wages as compensation.

“I wasn’t personally at the meeting, but those who attended told me. More than 5.400 people are losing their jobs,” Mikatsadze told bm.ge as cited by JAM News. He added that the company’s representative showed workers documents indicating government approval for the shutdown. “If the government is aware and the company is truly in crisis, the authorities should take responsibility and pay us the remaining amount or provide assistance,” Mikatsadze said. He also mentioned that the workers plan to issue a statement, which is currently being discussed.

Citing a drop in ferroalloy prices on the world market and permanent protests at the Chiatura mines, the company told workers a few days after the parliamentary vote to keep them on 60 per cent of pay plus insurance. Georgian Manganese, an industry giant that operates a ferroalloy plant in Zestaphoni and manganese mines in Chiatura, Imereti region, said the “temporary” arrangement would last until March 1, 2025.

“We hope that the situation in the global markets will improve soon and we will be able to restore the work process sooner than planned,” the company said in its October 31 statement. According to the company, one reason for the switch to a “temporary management regime” was the “sharp drop” in prices on the global silico-manganese market over the past two years. Georgian Manganese also cited ore shortages, blaming protesters in the mining town of Chiatura for shutting down “7 out of 12” mines, which the company said led to a 70 per cent drop in ore extraction.

Residents of Shukruti, a village in Chiatura, had for months picketed the Korokhnali and Shukruti mines to demand fair compensation after manganese mining severely damaged or destroyed their homes and orchards. In a controversial ruling in August, the local court banned the villagers from protesting near the mines. Demonstrators moved their protest to Tbilisi on September 12.  On October 24, however, demonstrators ended their protest in Tbilisi after two weeks of unsuccessful negotiations and ahead of the Georgian parliamentary elections. Since then, protests have continued in Shukruti.

According to Georgia’s National Statistics Office, ferroalloys are among the country’s primary exports, ranking third among the top ten.

Sources:
  •  JAM News, “Georgian manganese mines and ferroalloy plant halt operations, leaving 5,400 jobless”, https://jam-news.net/georgias-manganese-mines-and-ferroalloy-plant-halt-operations/
  • OC Media, “Georgian Manganese to stop work at Chiatura mines and ferroalloy plant”, https://oc-media.org/georgian-manganese-to-stop-work-at-chiatura-mines-and-ferroalloy-plant/
  • GABRITKHIDZE Nini, Civil.ge, “Thousands of Workers in Uncertainty as Georgian Manganese Halts Production”, https://civil.ge/archives/633133

Photo: Shutterstock.com

UBS wins 282 million USD cut in damages bill to Bidzina Ivanishvili

A Singapore court has slashed the damages Swiss UBS had to pay to Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili by USD 282 million. The damages UBS will now have to pay Ivanishvili have gone down from 743 million USD to 461 million USD. The dispute between Ivanishvili and Credit Suisse originated in 2011 when Ivanishvili was a bank client.

During this period, one of the bank’s managers, Patrice Lescadron, uncovered fraudulent activities involving the embezzlement of funds from confidential accounts, including those of Ivanishvili and his business partner, Russian oligarch Vitaly Malkin. A report by Swiss regulatory firm Finma revealed that Credit Suisse failed to take action despite numerous warnings and suspicious circumstances.

Ivanishvili accused Credit Suisse of negligence in protecting his investments, seeking 800 million USD in damages, alleging he incurred losses due to the actions of a former manager. However, Credit Suisse’s trust department deemed Ivanishvili’s claim excessive and petitioned the court for its dismissal.

In 2018, Patrice Lescadron was found guilty of fraud, spending two years in pre-trial detention before his release in 2019. In July 2020, he committed suicide. Lescadron had previously admitted to secretly covering the losses of clients affected by his poor investment decisions during the 2008 financial crisis with funds stolen from other clients’ accounts.

In March 2022, Ivanishvili reportedly won a lawsuit against Credit Suisse, receiving over 500 million USD. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ivanishvili faced additional legal disputes with Credit Suisse, including the freezing of his £2.7 billion account over concerns about the funds’ potential Russian origin. In September 2022, the oligarch argued in a Singapore court that Credit Suisse’s inaction led to a 1.27 billion USD loss. By February 2023, Bloomberg reported that Credit Suisse Group AG had paid Ivanishvili 210 million USD as part of the prolonged lawsuit. In July 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party’s parliamentary leader, Mamuka Mdinaradze, suggested that the West deliberately bankrupted Swiss banking giant Credit Suisse to pressure party founder and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Sources:
Accounts of Georgian employees of the “Atlantic Council” have been frozen

Three days before Georgia’s elections, on October 24, the Investigative Service of the Ministry of Finance searched multiple organisations, mainly targeting the Atlantic Council and its employees. These sudden examinations have caused concerns over the intent of the state.

Giorgi Noniashvili, a politician and co-founder of the Federalist Party, reported that such officials had raided his home, taking hold of his electronics and those of his wife and child. His wife, Sopo Gelava, is also an employee of the Atlantic Council and openly addressed the motives of the Ministry, claiming it was politically encouraged.

Eto Buziashvili, another employee of the Atlantic Council, let officials into her apartment after they impersonated gas company representatives. They spent two hours searching her property for incriminating material. “They took all my devices, including my laptop,” she stated.

On October 30, Gelava and Buziashvili, two Atlantic Council researchers whose houses were searched by the financial police two days before the election, say they now have no access to their bank accounts, with banks citing no legal justification or court order for freezing their accounts.

“What is interesting is that our bank accounts are not officially frozen, and then when we ask what the reason [for the problem] is, they tell us that there is some kind of technical problem, that the accounts are blocked, suspended,” Eto Buziashvili said, noting that banks do not clarify the reason for limited access to their accounts. “This is a very strange coincidence that Sopo and I are both researchers on Russian influence, and we are both studying disinformation in Georgia. First, just two days before the elections, they [the financial police] came to search us, and now, after four days, we, in fact, have no access to our accounts,” she added.

Sources:
  • RAZMADZE Mariam, Georgia Today, “Security raids target Atlantic Council employees”, https://georgiatoday.ge/security-raids-target-atlantic-council-employees/

  • JAM News, “Accounts of Georgian employees of the “Atlantic Council” have been frozen”, https://jam-news.net/accounts-of-georgian-employees-of-the-atlantic-council-have-been-frozen

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