Montenegro Prime Minister Milojko Spajic, Shutterstock 2421299093

Montenegrin Government Reshuffle: A chance for nothing

Omar Memišević is a Research Fellow at Strategic Analysis Think Tank

Challenges in the Western Balkans region seem as vivid as ever: internal relations within the countries themselves, regional relations stemming from the 1990s, wider socio-economic challenges, and those impacting the European future. The latest proof of this is the July 23 Government reshuffle in Montenegro, which was debated not just in Montenegro but in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as well on different levels. This change of the ruling coalition in the country is the latest in a several-year-long period of political instability, starting from 2016 onwards, the finale of which remains to be seen.

In essence, the impetus for the most recent governmental reshuffle in Montenegro can be traced back to the 2019 anti-government protests and the 2020 parliamentary elections in the country, when an anti-establishment coalition was voted into the government, ending the almost 30-year-long rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). This coalition was formed out of a wide range of parties, including the pro-Russian/pro-Serbian and pro-Western actors, with the only visible goal in the election campaign being the deposition of DPS and its President Milo Đukanović. The election results highlighted the power of DPS, but also the national sentiment pointed against 30 years of party rule, fuelled by perceived strongman tactics from Đukanović, rising organized crime rates, etc. While DPS still got the most votes (35%) and thus 30 seats in the 81-seat-strong Parliament, this was not enough for the formation of the ruling coalition mostly due to the fierce anti-DPS rhetoric during the campaign. The three runner-ups to DPS were Za Budućnost Crne Gore (eng. For the Future of Montenegro), a coalition of pro-Serbian parties headed by Zdravko Krivokapić, Mir je Naša Nacija (eng. Peace is Our Nation) a catch-all nominally pro-EU party, headed by Aleksa Bečić, and Građanski Pokret “URA” (eng. Civic Movement “URA”), a socially liberal party headed by an ethnic Albanian Dritan Abazović. These three parties managed to agree upon an expert government headed by Krivokapić, with Abazović as his deputy and Bečić as the president of Parliament.

This new government was somewhat short-lived, managing to govern 1 year and 145 days before being deposed and a new government formed under the leadership of Dritan Abazović, which later spent most of its tenure in technical mandate awaiting the 2023 early parliamentary elections. Following the June 2023 early parliamentary elections, and earlier in the March 2023 Presidential ones, DPS was completely voted out of power, with incumbent President Milo Đukanović losing the presidency to Jakov Milatović, vice president of Europa Sad! (eng. Europe Now), on a platform of economic recovery and pro-Western orientation. Europa Sad! being the electoral victor post-2023, formed the new government under the leadership of now PM Milojko Spajić and in coalition with a set of pro-Serbian parties headed by NSD – Nova Srpska Demokratija (eng. New Serb Democracy) and its leader Andrija Mandić who later became the president of the Montenegrin Parliament.

President of Montenegro Jakov Milatović, Shutterstock 2332644171

This new coalition raised several eyebrows in the region and in Montenegro itself, as it brought together parties perceived as being pro-Russian or pro-Serbian, as well as parties with a pro-Western policy approach. This was aided by the election of Mandić as the President of the Parliament, as well as public debate on the new state flag, new anthem, and the potential for de-recognition of Kosovo. Additionally, the new coalition gave leaders such as Mandić or Milan Knežević, a coalition MP with open pro-Serbian views, an unrestricted podium with much more publicity and an institutional background to spread their views, which were often seen as being openly anti-Montenegrin.

However, as the new coalition was quickly overshadowed by internal quarrels and challenges connected to a stagnating economy, Europe Now!-led economic platform called “Europe Now! 2”, proved to be ineffective in bolstering living standards in less developed cities in the country, failed to provide a significant increase in average pay or decrease the general standard of living in the country aided by the wider consequences of a post-Covid economy, war in Ukraine, etc. This lack of measurable government progress and the infighting among the coalition partners gave way to the potential of snap elections to help curb the lack of popularity of PM Spajić and the faltering parliamentary majority. As a result of this, as well as the personal quarrel between Montenegrin president Jakov Milatović and PM Spajić, a group of MPs, ministers, and other high-ranking officials of Europe Now! sided with Milatović and left the party, leaving the Spajić Cabinet without parliamentary support, thus forcing Europe Now! to start looking for new partners within the parliament to avoid the new elections where the lack of progress would probably usher in a new DPS government.

The negotiations started with the second largest national minority party in the country, representing the Bosniak national minority – the Bosniak Party (eng. Bošnjačka Stranka), as well as the biggest Albanian party in Montenegro. These negotiations drew severe criticism from both Albanian and Bosniak parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Albania, as well as members of other Bosniak political organizations in Montenegro, such as the Bosniak Council, due to their secrecy and the willingness of the Bosniak Party to even engage in negotiations with parties whose leaders were denying the Srebrenica Genocide, putting the country on a path of alignment with Serbia, and in case of Nikola Mandić, even individuals who have a possible involvement in the attack on Dubrovnik, or other 1990s war zones.

Despite the heavy criticism both internationally and within Montenegro itself, the parliament of the country approved the government reshuffle on July 24, 2024, with the largest majority in the history of Montenegro. The new government cabinet, headed by PM Spajić, is officially the largest in Montenegrin history, with a staggering 26 ministers and 7 deputy PMs, including several somewhat odd changes to a regular government structure, almost all of which were made to ensure the support of Bošnjačka Stranka and Albanian Alternative, the main ethnic Albanian party in the country. For instance, Ervin Ibrahimović, president of Bošnjačka Stranka, was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister for International Relations and Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the head of MFA in the previous Spajić Cabinet, Filip Ivanović, was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, and Maida Gorčević (BS) was appointed as the Minister of European Affairs. The same methodology was implemented for several other ministries, including defence, where Dragan Krapović was appointed alongside Aleksa Bečić, who holds the office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Security, Defense, Fight against Crime, and Internal Policy. In essence, almost all of the ministries have some kind of direct correlation with other ministries in the same government. The reshuffle has already prompted several comical challenges to its existence, with the latest one being the literal lack of space for the new ministers in the government meeting room.

Indeed, several challenges arise with this government as it is simply too big. First and foremost, the institutional context. Montenegro has a population of around 633.000, the current government has a total number of 31 Ministers, including 7 Deputy PMs. The question of sustaining such a large bureaucracy in a manner compatible with European standards and examples of good practice is possibly the most difficult to answer. In addition to the question of sustainability, there is the challenge of several ministries seemingly in charge of the same policy (i.e. Ibrahimović, Gorčević and Ivanović ministries, whose ministries are all connected to foreign and external relations). This begs a practical question: who runs the country’s diplomatic relations? Who liaisons between the UN and Montenegro? Or, in correlation to Bečić and Krapović’s ministries, who is in charge of the army procurement and NATO relations? In curbing the media chatter around this, the government issued a statement after the reshuffle, explaining why the agreement was reached as such.

President Milo Đukanović, Shutterstock 1668861592

According to the government, the parallel institutions mirror the government’s intent of focusing on international standing and EU integration of Montenegro, and as such, will not be a problem for future relations between coalition partners and will not lead to a lack of coordination between the ministries. As the government was appointed only several weeks ago, this remains to be unveiled, but we can safely assume that such a large government in such a small country will no doubt be difficult to maintain, in addition to a lack of friendly personal relations between ministers and the obvious overlap between competencies of individual ministries.

Aside from the obvious structural challenges, some of these surpass Montenegro, impacting the already fragile relations in the wider region. When the Bošnjačka Stranka opted to form a coalition with pro-Serbian parties in Montenegro, it prompted a quick reaction from the Bosniak public in BiH and Montenegro, with the number one argument used against this policy being the fact that the leaders of some parties in the coalition, such as Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević, are engaging in Srebrenica Genocide denial, support secessionists actions of Milorad Dodik in BiH, and are openly pro-Russian.

To help bolster his public opinion, Ervin Ibrahimović held a meeting with the association of Mothers of Srebrenica during their visit to Montenegro on July 26 this year, when they announced their support for the new government. In contrast, the lack of support was also quite vocal by the top religious leader of Montenegrin Bosniaks, Rifat Fejzić, the reasons for which are the views of Bosniaks by Mandić, Knežević, and others, and the genocide denial by these individuals.

Furthermore, this reshuffled coalition is probably going to stir up relations with Croatia, which are already heated after the parliamentary approval of the resolution on the Jasenovac genocide, which was supported by all government MPs with the inclusion of all Serb MPs. This led to Aleksa Bečić, Milan Knežević, and Andrija Mandić being designated as personae non gratae, as the trio were the ones who introduced the resolution to the floor and were the most vocal in its support. This marks the first time in the bilateral relations of the two countries that one of them is designating a national of the other as persona non grata and is bound to have an adverse impact on the Montenegrin EU membership process.

Ignoring the challenging bilateral relations Montenegro has in the wider region, the question that remains to be answered is whether this government will remain in power long enough to deliver on promises made. When observing the reactions of several political actors from Montenegro, none of them were too optimistic as to the longevity of the current majority. The reason behind this is the same reason behind their success – their sheer size. This is the biggest majority in history, but there might be simply too many of them to deliver anything of value to the citizens of Montenegro. There are too many parties, 10 of them to be precise, all with their interests and agendas, which seldom correlate and often clash and will be dependent on the leadership capabilities of Milojko Spajić, who is still being overshadowed by President Milatović. If PM Spajić proves himself to be a master in diplomacy and negotiations and reconciles the many different views, policies, and hubris, he might have a successful term as the first PM post-2020 with a full term as PM.

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