Dissemination of pro-Russian narratives via media in North Macedonia

Kateřina Sajdová

North Macedonians aren’t one of Russia’s staunchest supporters, and Russian interest in the country itself is not among the most notable in the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, Moscow does not appear to be reluctant to implement unique, suitable information meddling along with additional kinds of influence within the country to keep it out of European integration. It is important to be aware of it, even though North Macedonia is not currently a Kremlin’s interest hotspot.

The Western Balkan region as a whole is vital for Moscow, not only because Russia intends to dominate the post-communist Eastern bloc over the West but also because of its geostrategic location between the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea and close to the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia aims to influence identity politics, religious connections, and economic interests in the region while using a variety of assets to project soft power, including media outlets, the Orthodox Church, businesses, motorcycle gangs, and others. During the 1990s, Russia’s influence in the area was negligible, as NATO and the United States dominated. However, in the 2000s, things changed. Following the September 11 attacks, NATO’s aims broadened, and its focus switched to counterterrorism. As a result, responsibility for the region devolved mostly on the European Union, which lacked a clear and strong strategy towards the Western Balkans. Russia took the chances and focused on the Western Balkan area more thoroughly.

In recent years, the renewed Russian interest in North Macedonia and the Western Balkans has been primarily driven by “enlargement fatigue” within the EU and the Western push for Western Balkan countries to take a firm stance against Russia due to its aggression in Ukraine. This Western pressure, however, often fails to recognise the complex dynamics of the region. While Balkan history and politics are not inherently pro-Russian, they tend to be more anti-Western. The insistence on opposing Russia might backfire.

Even though four out of six Western Balkans countries, including North Macedonia, are now in the EU accession negotiations, the process of integration is too slow and is developing into “enlargement fatigue”. This creates a gap for Russia and China to disseminate their influence by taking advantage of the economic and European enlargement stagnation. The growing scepticism can be seen on Balkan Barometer from 2023, showing the continuing trend from 2022 of a decrease of positive viewing of EU membership by another 1% (already a 3% drop since 2021, until then, the support was rising). North Macedonia is the second with the lowest percentage of supporters after Serbia. 34% of the Western Balkan population still believes that the integration will happen until 2030 (3% less than in 2022), and another third goes for 2035. But the evidence that the trend of “enlargement fatigue” is real, is supported by the percentage rise to 24% of Western Balkans citizens who think that the integration will never happen. This growing scepticism towards the enlargement and the tiredness of how slow the process is developing creates an attractive gap for non-Western parties to intervene using the disillusionment of the Western Balkans population.

North Macedonians have also been disappointed with the European Union on a few occasions besides the slowness of the process itself. Greece’s denial of entry without a name change, Bulgaria’s veto because of disagreement over the constitutional status of the Bulgarian minority, and the Union’s lack of understanding for the North Macedonian side in both cases. Attitudes like these contribute to the establishment of an ideal environment for spreading anti-West narratives intermingled with pro-Russian agenda bearers. It’s essential to distinguish between anti-West and pro-Russian sentiments, as they are not always equivalent, especially in the Balkans. As Vuk Vuksanović from Belgrade Security Forum stated in the interview : “Russia is not popular in the region because of what it is, but because of what it is not – and that is not being the West” (Kolovska, 2024). A considerable amount of the Western Balkan s population, including North Macedonians, perceives Russia as a victim of the West rather than an aggressor. Another significant factor is that a GLOBSEC survey from 2021 indicated that 65% of North Macedonian respondents identify with the narrative of Russia as their Slavic brother.

This article will look closely at three examples out of the wide range of the carriers of pro-Russian discourses in the North Macedonian infosphere because even a seemingly harmless magazine aisle in North Macedonia may contain a secret motive. Pro-Russian narratives are invading the nation via unusual avenues such as alternative medicine journals, as well as more traditional methods such as dissemination of manipulation via the Orthodox Church and Russian embassy online activities. While some messages are obvious, others are expertly camouflaged. Russia’s never-ending fight against Western integrations persists, subtly threading its influence through various channels, perpetuating its agenda covertly.